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Sonja M. King and
Michael King,
Plaintiffs and Appellants
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vs.
Joe Barron,
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LOWELL V. SMITH
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
Attorneys for Appellee
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180

R. DALE POTTER
Attorney for Appellants
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

Sonja M. King and
Michael King,
Plaintiffs and Appellants
No. 19968
vs.
PETITION FOR
REHEARING

Joe Barron,
Defendant and Appellee

COMES NOW, Joe Barron, Defendant and Appellee, by and through his
attorney undersigned, and, pursuant to Rule 35 of the Rules of
the Utah Supreme Court, hereby petitions this Court for
rehearing of the decision filed November 4, 1988.
This Petition for Rehearing is supported by the Memorandum of
Points and Authorities attached hereto and incorporated herewith.
Counsel undersigned certifies that this petition is presented in
good faith and not for delay.
Dated this

3LUr

day of November 1988.
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LOWELL V. SMITH
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES
Nature of Petition for Rehearing
Appellee, Joe Barron, requests a rehearing of the Court's
decision that Appellant, on redirect examination, should be able
to testify that she did not receive an award in the King v.
Fereday matter.

The specific points which the Court should

reconsider are set forth below.
1. THE COURT'S OPINION ERRONEOUSLY STATES THAT BARRON'S POSITION
IS THAT PLAINTIFF SHOULD NOT BE ABLE TO EXPLAIN WHAT RESOLUTION
WAS MADE OF HER CLAIM AGAINST FEREDAY.
The opinion states:
"Barron contends that her testimony as to claims she
made
against Fereday was
admissible
as a prior
inconsistent
statement
or
as
an
admission
against
interest.
Barron would stop the inquiry there and
not allow Mrs. King to explain on redirect
examination
what resolution was made of her claims against Fereday."
Opinion Pages 5-6 (hereinafter, "Op. Pg.
")
In point of fact, the question asked by

Plaintiff's

counsel

did not deal with a resolution of the claims made against both
Mr. Fereday and Mr. Barron.

Rather, the question asked was

directed towards what "award" was made in the Fereday trial for
the 1982 accident.

In fact, the Plaintiff received no award

because the jury in the Fereday trial found that the accident was
caused by Mrs. King.

The Fereday jury made no determination

regarding whether there were damages appropriately related to the
Fereday accident.
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2.
MRS. KING WAS GIVEN FULL OPPORTUNITY TO EXPLAIN
RESOLUTION OF HER CLAIMS MADE IN THE FEREDAY MATTER.

THE

The opinion states:
"Once the subject of previous claims had been
interjected into the case by defendant to discredit
Mrs. King, we believe that she was entitled to make
a full disclosure on that subject to rehabilitate
herself and to dispel any inference that a verdict
for her would result in double recovery*" Op.pg 8-9.
Mrs. King was given, and took advantage of, her opportunity of
explaining the reason she made the same claims in both lawsuits.
Mrs. King reviewed the items claimed as damages thoroughly with
the jury.

The question asked by her counsel, however,

regarding

the award

received was calculated to lead to confusion rather

than clarification.

3. THE JURY WAS PROPERLY INSTRUCTED TO CONSIDER AND AWARD THOSE
DAMAGES, IF ANY, WHICH IT FOUND TO BE ASSOCIATED TO THE BARRON
ACCIDENT.
The jury was properly instructed to award those damages, if
any, resulting from the Barron accident.
$1,865 was supported by the evidence.

The jury verdict of

There is no evidence

to suggest that the jury award was influenced by considerations
of preventing a "double recovery".

THE PRECLUDED QUESTION ASKED BY PLAINTIFF'S
COUNSEL DID NOT DEAL WITH A RESOLUTION OF
PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS AGAINST FEREDAY
The Court's opinion states that Mrs. King should be able, on
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redirect examination, to explain what resolution was made of her
claims against Fereday.

The opinion implies that the question

asked by Mrs. King's counsel would have explained the resolution
of her claims.
In fact, the question asked by Mrs. King's counsel was not
directed towards clarifying the resolution of the claim made
against Fereday.

Plaintiff's Counsel asked:

Mr. Potter: Sonja, in the other action, was any award made
for the post '82 expenses? Tr. pg. 126.
Timely objection was made and sustained by the Court.
As this Court noted in its decision, the jury in the Fereday
matter made no award of damages due to a finding that the Fereday
accident was Mrs. King's fault, 100%. The issue concerning
whether an award was made was irrelevant because it did not deal
with the issue before the Barron court; i.e., what damages, if
any, were attributable to the Barron accident.

Had Plaintiff's

counsel inquired regarding whether the jury in the Fereday matter
had made a determination as to what injuries were attributable to
the Fereday accident or what injuries were attributable to the
Barron accident, perhaps such a question would have been helpful
to the jury in making its determination.

However, no finding at

all was made concerning damages in the Fereday matter.
To advise the jury that no award was made in the Fereday matter
was to invite the jury to speculate that all of the damages
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claimed by Mrs. King (in both lawsuits) had already been
determined by a previous jury to be attributable to the Barron
accident.

The Court's ruling that the evidence was irrelevant

left the jury to rely on the evidence submitted to it for its
consideration without influence from what the previous jury had
done.
Even if Mrs. King had been allowed to testify that she received
no award in the Fereday matter, would the jury have been better
informed?

An explanation would have been required to show the

reasons why no award was made.

Would the jury then have required

a summary of all of the evidence put on in the Fereday matter to
understand why the jury ruled as it did?
Consider the situation where a jury may have awarded to Mrs. King
the hundreds of thousands of dollars she sought from Mr. Fereday,
would such evidence have been relevant in the Barron matter

to

show that Mrs. King was compensated for the 1982 accident as well
as the 1978 accident?
The point is, of course, that an award of $150,000, $50,000,
$5,000 , $5.00 or any other sum, is not evidence of what the jury
did, or did not do, in the Fereday matter with regard to the
damages claimed in the Barron matter.

It is submitted that the proper way to handle these matters is to
have the jury instructed as it was here i.e., to judge the matter
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on the evidence before it and determine what damages, if any,
Mrs. King is entitled based on

such evidence.

The fact isf the award is irrelevant to the Barron jury since
it does not tend to make the existence of any fact more or less
probable than it is without the evidence.
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 302, defines "relevant evidence"
as:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence."
Defendant does not object to a thorough discussion concerning
Plaintiff's injuries, the number of accidents Plaintiff has been
involved in, the resolution of the claims against other parties,
whether a determination was made in the prior lawsuit as to the
damages sustained by Mrs. King, etc.

However, the question

asked concerning an award was not probative of the issues before
the Barron jury and did not deal with the resolution of the
claims made in the Feredav matter as to Mrs. King's claim there
that her injuries were caused by Mr. Fereday.

PLAINTIFF WAS GIVEN AN OPPORTUNITY OF
EXPLAINING WHY SHE CLAIMED THE SAME INJURIES
IN THE FEREDAY AND BARRON LAWSUITS
Plaintiff, on direct examination, expressed the injuries she
believed were attributable to the accident with Mr. Barron.
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She

attempted to designate those injuries which were caused by the
accident and those which she believed were aggravated by the
accident.

On cross-examination, Mrs. King was examined as to the

fact that she claimedf at the Fereday trial, that those same
injuries

were caused by Mr. Fereday's negligence.

She

acknowledged that she had claimed the same damages from both
Mr. Fereday and from Mr. Barron and had submitted the whole
amount to the Fereday jury.

(Tr. pg. 112)

On re-direct examination, was given full opportunity to
distinguish between those injuries claimed to have been caused by
Mr. Barron and those claimed from the prior accident.

Mrs. King

was examined as to the list of medical expenses which she had
submitted to the jury as a recapitulation of the expenses which
she now attributed to the Barron accident.

Even though Mrs. King

had submitted the same list of medical expenses to the Fereday
jury (with the addition of the medical expenses incurred before
the Barron accident)

she acknowledged that some of the medical

specials incurred after the Barron accident were clearly not
related to the Barron accident.

The medical recapitulation had

encompassed all of the medical expenses incurred after the date
of the accident.

Mrs. King testified that some of her treatment

was for on-going matters which she had already scheduled before
the Barron accident and for which she did not seek compensation
from Barron.

For example, she had already had an appointment
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scheduled with Dr. Gordon prior to being involved in the accident
with Mr. Barron.

Although she thought some of the expenses

associated with the visit may have been attributable to the
Barron accident, she acknowledged that some of the expense
may not have been associated with the Barron accident.

Her

counsel indicated, on the record, that he would:
"Stipulate that a portion of these expenses would not relate
to the 1982 collision even thought they were after the 1982
collision, and that would be more specifically the physical
therapy charges from Roger Larson that she was seeing before
the '82 collision occurred." Tr. pg 125.

Mr. Potter, continuing with his redirect examination, asked Mrs.
King to distinguish between those expenses attributable to the
Barron accident and those expenses which were on-going.

Mr.

Potter asked:
Mr. Potter:
Sonja, just to make sure we all have this
straight, are you
asking for any compensation on these
problems before 1982?
No.
Also, on the medical expenses, how much do you feel can be
attributed to the 1982 collision that's on your summary?
Mr. Smith: Your Honor, I would object unless there's some
foundation as to what basis she's using to make that
calculation.
The Court:

Sustained.

Thereafter, a discussion was had as to the basis for a
determination as to what expenses were attributable to the Barron
accident and what expenses were not.
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The Court ruled that Mrs.

King was fully entitled to tell the jury of the claims that she
was making at the trial attributable to the 1982 accident which
specific items represent the aggravation or the new condition
that was created•

However, the Court required her to establish a

foundation for making the determination.

The Court specifically

allowed Mrs. King to testify as to what she believed was caused
by the 1982 accident.
Thereafter, Mr. Potter asked:
Sonja, in the other action, was any award made for the post
'82 expenses?
Timely objection was made and sustained.
Mrs. King had already indicated which medical expenses she
believed were related to the accident of 1982 and which expenses
were not.

The question asked concerned the award given by the

Fereday jury.

As mentioned above, having explained the medical

expenses, having discussed the prior injuries claimed, the amount
of the award (based on a finding that Mrs. King was at fault in
causing the Fereday accident) was irrelevant.

THE JURY AWARD OF $1,865 WAS CLEARLY
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE AND DOES NOT
SHOW THAT THE JURY WAS INFLUENCED BY THE
DISCUSSIONS CONCERNING THE FEREDAY TRIAL
The Court's opinion states:
Arguably, the jury determined that while Barron was liable,
Mrs. King's 1978 injuries were not substantially aggravated
by the Barron accident. On the other hand, the low amount
of the jury's verdict ($1,865) may have stemmed from a
belief on the part of the jury that Mrs. King had recovered

8

in the Fereday suit some of the damages sought in the
instant case, and the jury did not want to award her double
recovery. We conclude that the erroneous evidentiary ruling
may have been prejudicial to Mrs. King, and we order a new
trial on the question of damages only.

The jury award of $1,865 was supported by the evidence submitted.
Mrs. King admitted that she did not go see her treating physician
for two weeks after the accident.

Evidence showed that, on her

first visit to physical therapist Roger Larson days after the
accident, she was feeling "improved".

The parties had stipulated

that, since the date of the Barron accident, Mrs. King had
incurred $1,429.00 in expenses (Tr. pg 29).

Of that amount,

$336.00 was for a spa membership at Gloria Marshall Salon.

(Tr.

pg. 25). Plaintiff admitted, and her counsel stipulated, that
some of the medical expenses incurred after the date of the
Barron accident, were not attributable to the Barron accident.
(Tr. pg. 125). She admitted that she had submitted her claim for
lost wages (including the time after the Barron accident) to the
Fereday jury for consideration.

(Tr. pg. 60). She admitted

that she had not worked for over two years before the Barron
trial, had not looked for a job, and had no offers for
employment. (Tr. pg. 61-52).
The jury was instructed, as this Court points out (Opinion pg. 9)
to determine liability for the 1982 accident and to award damages
flowing therefrom if Barron was found liable.
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There is no

evidence to suggest that the jury did anything other than follow
the instructions submitted.

Further, Plaintiff did not seek for an additur or seek to have
the trial judge modify the jury verdict.

The jury was polled and

each indicated that the verdict reached was his/her own.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, and each of them, it is respectfully
submitted that this Court should reconsider its opinion and
reverse the decision reached.

Respectfully submitted this

M

day of November, 1988.

\J. A
LOWELL V. SMITH
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee
HANSON, EPPERSON & SMITH
4 Triad Center, Suite 500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84180
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I certify that a true and correct copy of Defendant and
Appellee's Petition for Rehearing was mailed, postage prepaid,
this

pW~

day of

Ajn&—<U

1988, to:

R. Dale Potter
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
C-274 Cedar Park
5284 South 320 West
Salt Lake City, UT 84107

Lk

ii

jL'

